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This paper compares and contrasts exogenous (observed) and optimal fiscal policy in
an economy with Epstein-Zin (1989, 1991) preferences, with consumption tax, and a
common income tax, using a dynamic general-equilibrium model, calibrated to Bul-
garian data (1999-2016). The focus is on the relative importance of consumption vs.
income taxation, as well as on the provision of utility-enhancing public services. The
main findings are: (i) The optimal steady-state income tax rate is zero; (ii) The benev-
olent Ramsey planner sets optimally the utility-enhancing public services, which are
now 25% higher; (iii) The optimal steady-state consumption tax is approximately fifty
percent higher.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Since the early 1990s, many macroeconomic studies have focused on the effects of observed
fiscal policy in general equilibrium setups, and in particular comparing and contrasting it to a
benchmark, or “optimal fiscal policy” regime.1 The exercise was used to inform policymakers
about the taxation and spending mix in public finances, and how it needs to be adjusted to
improve efficiency in the economy. The main focus of those studies, however, has been pre-
dominantly how to raise an exogenously-set level of government purchases (consumption) via
distortionary capital and labor taxes. The literature overemphasized the distinction between
capital and labor income taxation, and abstracted away from consumption, or value-added,
taxation (VAT).2 Furthermore, in Eastern Europe, there was also a move toward a common
income tax rate, and reliance on indirect (consumption/VAT and excise) taxation.3
Bulgaria, a small Eastern European economy, and a EU member-state as of 2007, adopted a
public finance model that emphasized consumption-based taxation. As seen from Figure 1
on the next page, VAT revenue is the major source of tax revenue in Bulgaria4, responsible
for almost half of the total tax revenue raised.5 In addition, as of 2008 both capital and
labor income, as well as corporate profits are taxed at the common rate of 10 %. Therefore,
in addition to deciding on the optimal level of public spending, a fiscal authority in the
Bulgarian (and also EU) context is choosing a different set of tax rates - a common income
tax rate, and a tax rate on consumption. This public finance problem is thus different from
the one described in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994, 1999).6
1For, example, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994, 1999), and many others
2A non-exhaustive list includes Jones et al. (1997), Coleman (2000), Correia (2010), Turnovsky (2000),
Laczo and Rossi (2015), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
3The common tax rate on income was introduced in order to discourage individuals from moving income
between labor and capital to the category that is taxed at a lower rate.
4The situation is very similar for other Central and Eastern European economies as well.
5The other major source of revenue, making around a third of total tax revenues, are social contributions
made by both employers and employees. Compared to consumption-based taxation, which is a tax on
demand, income taxation in Bulgaria is of much smaller importance for the budget: for example, over the
period 2007- 2014, taxation of both individuals and corporations constitutes around 10 % of overall tax
revenue each
6This distinguishes our study from other papers in the literature, e.g., Coleman (2000), Turnovsky (2000),
and Correia (2010), among many others. In addition, the focus of the analysis is on the steady-state
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Figure 1: Fiscal importance of VAT revenue in Bulgaria (1997-2012)
Source: WDI (2015)
This paper also extends earlier research by introducing Epstein-Zin (1989, 1991) recursive
preference and the motive for so-called ”early resolution of uncertainty” in the economy,
which could produce interesting and novel results.7 The particular advantage of those pref-
erences is that they feature constant (but unrelated) coefficients of risk aversion and elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution.8 After all, the two parameters are distinct features of
household’s preferences, and should be parameterized separately from each other. Consumer
preferences play a crucial role in any economic model; after all, we derive consumers’ opti-
mal decision rules from those, in order to evaluate the quantitative effects of different fiscal
allocations, in contrast to Correia (2010), who focuses on optimized impulse responses, and Schmidt-Grohe
and Uribe (2006, 2007) who also study the adjustment of fiscal policy instruments along the transition
path; instead, here we are more interested in the average rates of income and consumption taxes, given that
consumption taxation is responsible for almost a half of total government revenue.
7We differ from Karantounias (2018) in important way, as in this paper we also allow for optimally-chosen
government consumption. In addition, Karantounias (2018) does not consider consumption taxation.
8In the usual formulation with time-separable preferences, one is reciprocal of the other. This is a problem
as in data both a low elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, and low risk aversion have been measured.
As pointed in Weil (1990), researchers in macroeconomics should distinguish between risk aversion and the
willingness to substitute consumption over time in their models.
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policies.
The paper then proceeds to characterize optimal (Ramsey) fiscal policy in the context of
the problem described above and then to evaluate it relative to the exogenous (observed)
fiscal policy regime. Similar to earlier literature, e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and Zhu
(1992), allowing distortionary taxation in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework cre-
ates interesting trade-offs: On the one hand, valuable government services directly increase
household’s utility. On the other, the proportional income taxes will negatively affect the
incentives to supply labor and to accumulate physical capital. In turn, higher taxes reduce
not only income, but also consumption, which is actually hit twice due to a second round of
taxation, this time at the point of consumption. Both types of taxes lower welfare, both di-
rectly, and indirectly, by generating less tax revenue which could be spent on valuable public
services. The optimal fiscal policy problem discussed in this paper is to choose consumption
and a common income tax rate to finance both utility-enhancing and redistributive govern-
ment expenditure, while at the same time minimizing both the allocative distortions created
in the economy, as a result of the presence of proportional taxation. The main findings
from the computational experiments performed are: (i) The optimal steady-state income
tax rate is zero; (ii) The benevolent Ramsey planner provides the optimal amount of the
utility-enhancing public services, which are now 25% higher; (iii) The optimal steady-state
consumption tax needed to finance the optimal level of government spending is fifty percent,
as compared to the exogenous policy case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model framework
and describes the decentralized equilibrium system, Section 4 discusses the calibration pro-
cedure, and Section 4 presents the steady-state model solution. Sections 5 proceeds with
the optimal taxation (Ramsey) policy problem and evaluates the long-run effects on the
economy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Model Description
The model closely follows Vasilev (2018a). There is a representative households which de-
rives utility out of consumption, leisure, and government services. The time available to
households can be spent in productive use or as leisure. The government taxes consumption
spending and levies a common tax on all income, in order to finance purchases of government
consumption goods, and government transfers. On the production side, there is a represen-
tative firm, which hires labor and capital to produce a homogenous final good, which could
be used for consumption, investment, or government purchases.
2.1 Household
There is a representative household, which maximizes a utility function, which features
recursive preferences as in Epsten and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1990):
Vt =
[
















and Vt is the value function as of period t, 0 < ν1, ν2, 1− ν1 − ν2 < 1 are the utility weights





risk-adjusted expectation operator at of period t, ct denotes household’s private consump-
tion in period t, ht are hours worked in period t, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
9
With Epstein-Zin preferences, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), and the
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) are separated. More specifically, γ ≥ 0 is the
parameter that controls risk aversion, while ψ ≥ 0 is the IES.10 Note that for values of γ > 1,
and ψ > 1, the agent has a preference for ”an early resolution of uncertainty” (Kreps and
9Importantly, these preferences are stationary in the sense of Koopmans (1960).
10Therefore, this class of preferences responds to Hall’s (1988) critique. In contrast, with other functional
forms the elasticity of substitution and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are reciprocals of one another.
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Porteus 1978, Weil 1990).11 In other words, the household is averse to volatility in future
utility, and more specifically, the recursive utility formulation adds curvature with respect
to future risks.12
The household starts with an initial stock of physical capital k0 > 0, and has to decide
how much to add to it in the form of new investment. The law of motion for physical capital
is
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt (2.4)
and 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate. Next, the real interest rate is rt, hence the before-tax
capital income of the household in period t equals rtkt. In addition to capital income, the
household can generate labor income. Hours supplied to the representative firm are rewarded
at the hourly wage rate of wt, so pre-tax labor income equals wtht. Lastly, the household
owns the firm in the economy and has a legal claim on all the firm’s profit, πt.
















(1 + τ ct )ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt = (1− τ
y
t )[wtht + rtkt] + g
t
t + πt (2.6)
where τ ct is the (potentially time-varying) tax on consumption, τ
y is the proportional in-
come tax rate (0 < τ c, τ y < 1), levied on both labor and capital income (also potentially
11Note that, as in Epstein and Zin (1991), early resolution of uncertainty requires






For ψ, γ > 1 the condition above is satisfied.
12As pointed out in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010), investors with Epstein-Zin preferences also
demand a premium for holding asserts, which are correlated with shocks to expected consumption growth.
When households have preferences for early resolution of uncertainty, these shocks carry a positive price of
”long-run risk” (Bansal and Yaron 2004). In applied work, this risk can be potentially defined using shocks
to the continuation value, normalized by consumption, via shocks to the wealth-to-consumption ratio, or
shocks to the expected future consumption growth.
6
time-varying), and gtt denotes government transfers. The household takes the two tax rates
{τ c, τ y}, government spending categories, {gct , gtt}∞t=0, profit {πt}∞t=0, the realized technology
process {At}∞t=0, prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, and chooses {ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize its utility sub-
ject to the budget constraint.13 The constraint optimization problem generates the following
optimality conditions:
Vt : Vt −
[






























θ = λt(1 + τ
c
t ) (2.8)
ht : (1− ν)
[


















θ = λt(1− τ yt )wt (2.9)
kt+1 : λt = βEtλt+1[1 + (1− τ yt+1)rt+1 − δ] (2.10)
TV C : lim
t→∞
βtλtkt+1 = 0 (2.11)
where λt is the Lagrangean multiplier attached to household’s budget constraint in period
t. The interpretation of the first-order conditions above is as follows: the first one states
that for each household, besides caring for the short-run (period t vs. period t + 1 utility),
the household cares also for the “long run”, in the sense that the entire sequence of future
consumption and leisure—captured by continuation values—directly affects the state of the
economy in t+ 1. The second equation states that when choosing labor supply optimally, at
the margin, each hour spent by the household working for the firm should balance the benefit
from doing so in terms of additional income generates, and the cost measured in terms of
lower utility of leisure. The third equation is the so-called ”Euler condition,” which describes
how the household chooses to allocate physical capital over time. The last condition is called
the ”transversality condition” (TVC): it states that at the end of the horizon, the value of
physical capital should be zero.
13Note that by choosing kt+1 the household is implicitly setting investment it optimally.
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2.2 Firm problem
There is a representative firm in the economy, which produces a homogeneous product. The
price of output is normalized to unity. The production technology is Cobb-Douglas and uses





t − rtkt − wtht, (2.12)
where At denotes the level of technology in period t. Since the firm rents the capital from
households, the problem of the firm is a sequence of static profit maximizing problems. In










In equilibrium, given that the inputs of production are paid their marginal products, πt = 0,
∀t.
2.3 Government
In the model setup, the government is levying taxes on labor and capital income, as well as
consumption, in order to finance spending on wasteful government purchases, and govern-





t ct + τ
y
t [wtht + rtkt] (2.15)
Tax rates and government consumption-to-output ratio would be chosen to match the average
share in data, and government transfers would be determined residually in each period so
that the government budget is always balanced.
2.4 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
For a given process followed by technology {At}∞t=0 average tax rates {τ c, τ y}, initial cap-
ital stock {k0}, the decentralized dynamic competitive equilibrium is a list of sequences
{ct, it, kt, ht, Vt}∞t=0 for the household, a sequence of government purchases and transfers
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{gct , gtt}∞t=0, and input prices {wt, rt}∞t=0 such that (i) the household maximizes its utility
function subject to its budget constraint; (ii) the representative firm maximizes profit; (iii)
government budget is balanced in each period; (iv) all markets clear.
3 Data and Model Calibration
To characterize the business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria, we will focus on the period
following the introduction of the currency board (1999-2016). Quarterly data on output,
consumption and investment was collected from National Statistical Institute (2017), while
the real interest rate is taken from Bulgarian National Bank Statistical Database (2017). The
calibration strategy described in this section follows a long-established tradition in modern
macroeconomics: first, as in Vasilev (2016), the discount factor, β = 0.982, is set to match
the steady-state capital-to-output ratio in Bulgaria, k/y = 13.964, in the steady-state Euler
equation. The labor share parameter, 1 − α = 0.571, is obtained as in Vasilev (2017), and
equals the average value of labor income in aggregate output over the period 1999-2016.
This value is slightly higher as compared to other studies on developed economies, due to
the overaccumulation of physical capital, which was part of the ideology of the totalitarian
regime, which was in place until 1989.
Next, the average income tax rate was set to τ y = 0.1. This is the average effective tax
rate on income between 1999-2007, when Bulgaria used progressive income taxation, and
equal to the proportional income tax rate introduced as of 2008. Similarly, the tax rate on
consumption is set to its value over the period, τ c = 0.2. As in Herberger (2013), the relative
risk aversion parameter and the IES are set to γ = 2 and ψ = 0.043, respectively. Next, the
relative weight attached to the utility out of consumption in the household’s utility function,
ν1, is calibrated to match that in steady-state consumers would supply one-third of their
time endowment to working. This is in line with the estimates for Bulgaria (Vasilev 2017a)
as well over the period studied. The relative weight attached to government services was
set in line with the observed shares of public and private consumption in national accounts,
thus 1 − ν1 − ν2 = 0.07. Residually, ν2 = 0.62, which means that leisure is twice more
valuable than private consumption, a result which perfectly aligns with the literature. Next,
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the steady-state depreciation rate of physical capital in Bulgaria, δ = 0.013, was taken from
Vasilev (2017b). It was estimated as the average quarterly depreciation rate over the period
1999-2014. parameters used in the paper.
Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital Share Data average
1− α 0.571 Labor Share Calibrated
γ 2.000 Relative risk aversion parameter Set
ψ 0.043 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution Set
ν1 0.310 Utility weight attached to consumption Calibrated
ν2 0.620 Utility weight attached to leisure Calibrated
1− ν1 − ν2 0.070 Utility weight attached to public cons. Calibrated
δ 0.013 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
τ y 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data average
τ c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
4 Steady-State
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state equilibrium system
solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. The results are
reported in Table 2 below. The steady-state level of output was normalized to unity (hence
the level of technology A differs from one, which is usually the normalization done in other
studies), which greatly simplified the computations. Next, the model matches consumption-
to-output and government purchases ratios by construction; The investment ratios are also
closely approximated, despite the closed-economy assumption and the absence of foreign
trade sector. The shares of income are also identical to those in data, which is an artifact
of the assumptions imposed on functional form of the aggregate production function. The
after-tax return, where r̄ = (1−τ y)r−δ is also relatively well-captured by the model. Lastly,
given the absence of debt, and the fact that transfers were chosen residually to balance the
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government budget constraint, the result along this dimension is understandably not so close
to the average ratio in data.
Table 2: Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.648 0.674
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
k/y Capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96
gc/y Government consumption-to-output ratio 0.151 0.151
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333
r̄ After-tax net return on capital 0.014 0.016
5 The Ramsey problem (Optimal fiscal policy under
full commitment)
In this section, we solve for the optimal fiscal policy scenario under full commitment. More
specifically, the government will be modelled as a benevolent planner, who has the same
preferences as the people in the economy, i.e., it will choose to maximize the household’s
utility function, while at the same time taking into account the optimality conditions by both
the household and the firm, or the equations describing the DCE.14 The fiscal instruments
at government’s disposal are consumption and income tax rate, and the level of public
consumption spending.15 In this section we allow only for distortionary, or proportional,
14Note that when the household and the firm are making optimal choices, they are taking all fiscal policy
variables as given. Also note that the benevolent government treats everyone the same.
15Note that the government transfers will be held fixed at the level computed from the equilibrium under
the exogenous policy case.
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taxes, thus the optimal allocations are only ”second-best.”16 In addition, it will be assumed
that the government can also fully and credibly commit to the future sequence of taxes and
spending until the end of the optimization period, so the policy is time-consistent. Under
the Ramsey framework, the choice variables for the government are {ct, ht, gct , kt+1, wt, rt}∞t=0
plus the two tax rates {τ ct , τ
y
t }∞t=0. The initial conditions for the state variable k0, as well
as the realized sequence of government transfers {gtt}∞t=0 and the fixed level of total factor
productivity A are taken as given. The optimal policy problem is then recast as a setup
where the government chooses after-tax input prices w̃t and r̃t directly, where
w̃t = (1− τ yt )wt (5.1)
r̃t = (1− τ yt )rt. (5.2)





t − r̃tkt − w̃tht = gct + gtt (5.3)
















(1− ν)(1 + τ ct )ct = ν(1− ht)w̃t (5.5)























θ [1 + r̃t+1 − δ] (5.6)
Akαt h
1−α





t − r̃tkt − w̃tht = gct + gtt (5.8)
16In case the government is allowed to use lump-sum taxation, it can achieve the first-best (Pareto)
allocation.
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t − ct − kt+1 + (1− δ)kt − gct ]




t − r̃tkt − w̃tht − gct − gtt] (5.9)
As in Vasilev (2018d), we will shut down all stochasticity (uncertainty) and focus on the
steady-state allocations and prices. We solve the problem numerically and report the results
in Table 3 below against the values from the exogenous (observed) policy case.
Total discounted welfare is higher under the Ramsey regime: As in Lucas (1990), parameter ξ
is introduced to measure the welfare gain in terms of higher steady-state consumption (24%)
when the economy moves to the optimal scal policy case. Next, private consumption in the
optimal policy case is higher (even though the consumption share is lower, which is since
output is now much higher), while private capital- and investment shares are higher, and thus
the interest rate is lower. The model generates a zero long-run income tax, which consistent
with the findings in earlier studies, e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and Zhu (1992). This
leads to higher capital input and labor supplied in steady-state, which in turn translates into
higher output and investment. Under Ramsey, the steady-state private consumption is lower,
but public consumption overcompensates, so overall welfare increases despite the increase in
hours. In other words, the government internalizes (at least partially) the externality of the
utility-enhancing public services when maximizing household’s overall utility.17 Finally, in
order to finance the increased government consumption spending, consumption tax rate has
to almost double - from 20% to 34%. In contrast to the income tax, the consumption tax is
less distortionary, as it is a tax on demand, rather than tax on productive inputs. Therefore,
17However, given that 1 − ν1 − ν2 is significantly lower than unity, government purchases do not change
much, especially as a share of output.
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Table 3: Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model Model
(exo policy) (optimal)
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000 1.244
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.648 0.674 0.649
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175 0.186
k/y Capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96 14.30
gc/y Government consumption-to-output ratio 0.151 0.151 0.150
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429 0.429
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333 0.367
w̄ After-tax wage - 1.543 1.543
r̄ After-tax net return on capital 0.014 0.016 0.016
τ y Income tax rate 0.100 0.100 0.000
τ c Consumption tax rate 0.200 0.200 0.339
ξ Welfare gain (% cons.) - 0.000 24.03
the optimal policy suggests abolishing all direct taxation, and adopt a public finance model
that relies exclusively on indirect taxation. These results are new and could be of interest
to policy makers.
6 Conclusions
This paper explores the effects of fiscal policy in an economy with Epstein-Zin (1989, 1991)
preferences, with indirect (consumption) taxes, and all (labor and capital) income being
taxed at the same rate. To this end, a dynamic general-equilibrium model, calibrated to
Bulgarian data (1999-2016), is augmented with a government sector. Two regimes are com-
pared and contrasted - the exogenous (observed) vs. optimal policy (Ramsey) case. The
focus of the paper is on the relative importance of consumption vs. income taxation, as well
as on the provision of utility-enhancing public services. Bulgarian economy was chosen as a
case study due to its major dependence on consumption taxation as a source of tax revenue.
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The main findings from the computational experiments performed in the paper are: (i) The
optimal steady-state income tax rate is zero; (ii) The benevolent Ramsey planner provides
the optimal amount of the utility-enhancing public services, which are now 25% higher; (iii)
The optimal steady-state consumption tax needed to finance the optimal level of government
spending is more than fifty percent higher, as compared to the exogenous policy case.
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